Wireless networking relies on a fundamental building block, neighbor discovery (ND). The nature of wireless communications, however, makes attacks against ND easy: An adversary can simply replay or relay (wormhole) packets across the network and mislead disconnected nodes into believing that they communicate directly. Such attacks can compromise the overlying protocols and applications. Proposed methods in the literature seek to secure ND, allowing nodes to verify they are neighbors. However, they either rely on specialized hardware or infrastructure, or offer limited security. In this paper, we address these problems, designing a practical and secure neighbor verification protocol for constrained Wireless Sensor networks (WSNs). Our scheme relies on estimated distance between nodes and simple geometric tests, and it is fully distributed. We prove our protocol is secure against the classic 2-end wormhole attack. Moreover, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation with off-theshelf WSN equipment: Cricket motes.
Consider two sensor nodes A and B, out of each other's communication range, and an adversary that controls two relay nodes M and W , within range of A and B, respectively. The adversarial node M receives packets from A, relays them to W , and then retransmits them to B. The result is that, through a false link, A and B are misled to believe that they are neighbors, although they are not. Consequently, such an adversary can control the victims' communication, or more generally, he can control multi-hop communication by shortening communication paths and manipulating other system's operations.
The importance of "wormhole" or "relaying" attacks in wireless networks has been identified in the literature. The importance of these attacks is due to the fact that it is easy for an adversary to act at the physical layer without any node compromise or possession of cryptographic keys. Secure neighbor verification thwarts this attack, essentially, by identifying as neighbors only those nodes that are indeed neighbors. However, a neighbor verification protocol does not have to be complete, i.e. to discover and verify all actual neighbors. This is, most notably, due to the jamming attack that the adversary can always perform to prevent the discovery of legitimate neighbors.
As corroborated by a recent impossibility result for a broad class of secure wireless ND protocols (run by two correct nodes in the presence of the wormhole), it is quite challenging, in general, to verify communication neighborhood, i.e., to discover other nodes that can directly communicate with a considered node [12] . Hence, in practice, secure ND protocols often approximate it with physical neighborhood, where nodes prove they are in vicinity of each other.
A number of solutions to secure ND have been proposed thus far. However, as we show in Section 2, virtually all of them are not generally applicable to WSN, either because they need specialized hardware, or they rely on the presence of an external trustworthy infrastructure, or because they are based on assumptions that limit their applicability.
In this paper, we design a powerful and secure neighbor verification protocol that adheres to the limited hardware capabilities of WSN, as it is demonstrated by our implementation. In our protocol, each node estimates its distance to the other nodes it can communicate with through a single hop. Then, nodes exchange information about their estimates. Next, a series of simple geometric tests is run by each node over the local neighborhood view it has obtained, in order to detect topology distortions created by wormhole attacks. Only those nodes that successfully pass the tests are verified to be actual communication neighbors.
Our results show that these tests are highly effective. To create false links, the adversary needs to carefully adjust the distance between victims by selecting the appropriate delays introduced when relaying messages. The adjustment is based on the location of the motes. Without centimeterprecision knowledge of location of victim nodes, which is hard to obtain, the adversary has only a negligible chance to create false links. Even with that knowledge, we show that the adversary cannot create any false links with a 2-end attack. We also show, using simulations, that the number of false links that an adversary can create with a k-end wormhole is highly limited. The latter results are omitted from this version of the paper due to space limitations, and we refer the reader to the associated technical report [15] .
Our solution is independent of the technology that wireless devices use to estimate their distance to each other. Nonetheless, our proof-of-concept implementation relies on off-the-shelf WSN equipment: Cricket motes that are capable of ultra-sound (US) ranging. However, the simple ranging protocol that is implemented in Cricket motes is replaced with our secure ranging protocol, which is tailored to our security requirements. Overall, our contributions in this paper are: (i) a secure ND scheme tailored for WSN, (ii) the provable security 1 of the protocol against a 2-end wormhole, (iii) the implementation and experimental evaluation of the protocol with existing WSN hardware.
RELATED WORK
A number of secure neighbor discovery schemes have been proposed in the literature. We briefly survey schemes that are not generally applicable to WSN, because of their special hardware requirements or dependance on additional infrastructure. Then, we discuss in details the applicable schemes and compare them with our proposal.
The scheme proposed in [4] detects wormhole attacks using directional antennas, that are not common for WSN. RFfingerprinting, i.e., recognizing a wireless transceiver based on unique features of the signals it generates, is considered in [13] . However, the signal analysis that this scheme performs is not feasible for a typical sensor mote radio receiver. Geographical packet leashes [5] rely on location information to estimate the distance between the nodes, and thus prevent wormhole attacks. However, node knowledge of secure location is hard to obtain in many settings. In particular, secure localization schemes for WSN require additional infrastructure such as a number of location-aware beacons [16] . This type of additional infrastructure is also the basis of a wormhole prevention scheme proposed in [11] .
Another method to estimate the distance between wireless nodes uses the message time-of-flight (through the US [14] , or RF medium [5] [17]) between two nodes. US-based distance measurement is not secure in general: An adversary can decrease the distance by relaying a slow US signal over a fast relay link. The RF-based method is also problematic, especially in the context of sensor networks, given the lightspeed propagation of RF waves. To precisely estimate the distance, a nanosecond precision clock is required, that is well beyond the capabilities of existing sensor motes.
Nevertheless, it is possible to measure the RF time-offlight with the best precision available, as proposed in [9] for generic wireless networks, in [3] for 802.11, or [1] for WSN. Actually, our scheme utilizes this method (in the synchronization phase). The microsecond precision clock available on sensor motes allows us to thwart store-and-forward wormhole attacks, and to prevent the adversary from creating very long false links. However, false links spanning over few hops are not detected. Hence, our protocol also includes more sophisticated defense mechanisms.
Two centralized approaches that rely on distance measurements [18] or only connectivity information [2] are proposed. Both are essentially implementable on WSNs, but have some drawbacks. The former visualizes the network and requires user interaction to localize the wormholes, limiting its applicability. The latter detects wormhole attacks based on the abnormal values of some statistics of the connectivity graph, but this requires assumptions about the expected values of these statistics. Moreover, no information about the location of the detected wormhole is provided.
A distributed scheme that relies only on connectivity information detects wormhole attacks by checking for forbidden structures in the connectivity graph [7] . A forbidden structure is a graph that is very unlikely to be observed as a subgraph of a legitimate connectivity graph, but that often appears under the attack: The precise form of these structures depends on the connectivity pattern. This method demonstrates good performance (specifically high detection rates) for dense networks when evaluated (with simulations) under theoretical connectivity patterns (unit-disk (UDG), quasi-UDG and the TOSSIM models). However, the scheme is not investigated in a real deployment, with a high irregularity of antenna patterns [20] . Under such conditions, the authors of [7] propose to empirically estimate the forbidden structures in an attacker-free part of the network. However, it might be impossible, or prohibitively expensive, to verify that a part of the network is wormhole-free. Besides, a part of the network does not necessary represent the entire network accurately. Furthermore, the security of this scheme is not analyzed under k-end relay attacks.
SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a static WSN where nodes (motes), A, B, . . . ., are distributed throughout a field. For the sake of simplicity, our analysis assumes nodes are deployed on a plane, but our protocol can easily be extended for nodes deployed in three dimensions. Nodes are correct, i.e., follow the protocol. The distance from A to B as measured by A, is denoted by dAB, whereas |AB| denotes the actual (Euclidean) distance between nodes (or points) A and B.
Each node is equipped with a microsecond precision clock, and two network interfaces: a radio-frequency (RF) and a sound (typically, ultra-sound (US)) interface. R is the range of the US technology, s = 342m/s is the speed of sound, and c = 3 × 10 8 m/s is the speed of light. We call two nodes, A and B, neighbors if and only if they are in physical proximity of each other, i.e., |AB| < R, and they can communicate directly in a symmetric way using both US and RF.
Nodes can perform cryptographic operations with a symmetric key K: encryption (EK{.}), message authentication code (M ACK{.}), and hash or one-way functions (H{.}) computations. They can also generate fresh random nonces. Every pair of nodes, A, B, running a ND protocol shares a symmetric key, KAB.
Adversary Model
We are only concerned with external adversaries that cannot compromise correct nodes or their cryptographic keys. The adversary controls a number of relay nodes we also term as wormhole ends. The relay nodes are connected through an out-of-band relay link, over which information propagates with speed equal to the speed of light, c. Every relay node is equipped with one radio (RF) interface, and exactly one ultra-sound (US) interface with an omnidirectional transceiver.
We assume the adversary is sophisticated enough to relay messages on a per-symbol basis (i.e. messages are relayed at the physical layer and the adversary is not limited to storeand-forward relaying). The processing time at wormhole ends is considered to be below 1µ second. As the reception time of an US message is estimated with microsecond precision, such relaying delay has a negligible effect on USbased distance measurements. This is so when the attacker relays US signals over short relay links. However, long relay links (above 300m) introduce a non-negligible delay (a few microseconds) to relayed messages.
Messages (both RF and US) eavesdropped by a relay node can be selectively discarded, modified, delayed, or replicated before being relayed by another node. The adversary can also inject new messages into the network, but it is computationally bounded and unable to mount cryptanalytic attacks or to guess fresh nonces.
THE SCHEME
In the initialization phase of the network, when nodes discover their neighbors, there is no guarantee that the nodes that appear to be neighbors are indeed so. Our secure neighbor verification protocol will address this, relying on the previously established security associations (SAs) using a key establishment protocol (e.g., [21] ). The protocol is intended to run after most of the WSN nodes are deployed and SAs are established. If the network topology changes significantly, as the operator relocates nodes or deploys new ones, the protocol is re-run. The protocol consists of the following phases:
(i) Ranging Given a list of potential neighbors, every node calculates its distance to all of its neighbors using our US-based ranging protocol.
(ii ) Neighbor Table Exchange After the ranging phase, every node shares with each of its neighbors (in an authenticated manner) the neighbor table, including the distances calculated in the ranging phase. Then, each node creates a table that includes the distances between its neighbors in addition to its own distance to its neighbors.
(iii ) Link Verification The extended neighbor table is examined by a number of security tests. As a result, each link is verified in the case it passes specific tests. Otherwise, it is marked as an unverifiable link.
The protocol operates with a set of parameters adjusted based on the physical characteristics of the communication channel. ǫsym is the upper bound on the amount of link asymmetry error. ǫ quad is the upper bound on the error of determining if four points are part of a quadrilateral on a plane (e.g., being a tetrahedron). Finally, ǫsync is the bound on propagation delay estimation error.
Ranging
A three-step ranging protocol is run once by every node in the network. The first step of the ranging phase, that is performed over RF, allows the initiator node, A, to synchronize itself with its neighbors (with microsecond precision). In this step, nodes do not adjust their clocks after synchronization; rather, the difference between clock readings at A and at a neighbor B is determined, which will be used in security tests and distance measurement. The second step, performed over US, is the actual ranging. This operation is done simultaneously for all neighbors, by broadcasting an ultra-sound message. The last step, acknowledgement, finalizes the ranging and secures the synchronization. Figure 1 illustrates one execution of the ranging protocol between node A and two of its neighbors B and C. Next, we focus on explaining communication between A and B in detail. Synchronization The initiator, A, sends via RF a REQ message to B, and it records the time of transmission as t A REQ . The REQ message contains an encrypted freshly generated nonce, N r B , which is different for every neighbor B and is used to authenticate B's response. It also contains the hash function value of another fresh nonce N s , used in the ranging phase, which is the same for all neighbors of A. The whole message, including the header, is authenticated with a MAC using the shared secret key between A and B. Having received such a message, if the MAC is correct and N r B has not been seen or generated as a nonce before, node B records the time of reception t A :
If B has sent correct REP , then:
If MAC is correct and N s = N s B , and
The ACK message contains N s , to bind it to the earlier transmitted REQ and RN G messages, and three timestamps, t A REQ , t A REP and t A RNG , that allow B to assure if the synchronization was done correctly, i.e., no delay beyond the propagation delay (which is below 1µs for RF communication at the range we are considering) was introduced while the messages were in transit. Node B also checks if the received nonce in the ranging phase, N s B , is equal to N s (that was sent by A). If the checks are successful, B uses the time-stamps to calculate its distance to A. To provide authentication and integrity, the ACK message includes also the MAC over all its content.
Neighbor Table Exchange
The neighbor table N TA, constructed by every node A in the network, contains the identifiers of its neighbors that were previously properly ranged and its distance to them. Neighbors for which ranging failed are not included in the table. The table is broadcasted (authenticated for all neighbors) within the N T E message, as shown below.
Every node A combines its own N TA and the received neighbor tables from its neighbors into a new neighbor table, N T 2A, to be used in the link verification phase. N T 2A is the set that is composed of A itself and its neighbors, plus the distances between members of this set.
Link Verification
The link verification consists of the following consistency tests that node A runs on N T 2A. If at any point a link is discarded, it is ignored in the subsequent steps.
(i) Link Symmetry Test: Any link (U, V ) is discarded if dUV is different from dV U . This includes links for which only one measurement is available.
for all U, V ∈ N T 2A do if |dUV − dV U | > ǫsym then remove links (U, V ) and (V, U ) from N T 2A (ii ) Maximum Range Test: Links longer than the range R are discarded.
for all U, V ∈ N T 2A do if dUV > R then remove links (U, V ) and (V, U ) from N T 2A (iii ) Quadrilateral Test: For every neighbor B 2 , node A looks for two other nodes C and D that together they form a 4-clique (i.e., all four are neighbors of each other, and A knows the distances between all of them). The links to B, C, and D are declared verified if four of the nodes form a quadrilateral that is convex. We note that it is possible that after all the 4-cliques that include (A, B) as a link have been checked, the link is not verified. In this case, the link is declared as unverifiable. How to treat unverifiable links depends on the security policy of the network.
for . For both positions, we check if the difference between the measured length dCD and the length of CD determined by the calculated positions of C and D is within ǫ quad bounds. If it is not in both cases, the distances do not belong to any quadrilateral. Otherwise, we assign the matching position to D. Here, ǫ quad is computed based on the empirical distance measurement error.
Given the positions computed in the quadrilateral test above, to test if the quadrilateral is convex we compute the product of four cross products (
. If the product is positive, the quadrilateral is convex, whereas if it is negative the quadrilateral is concave. We ignore the quadrilateral if any three nodes are co-linear. This is tested by checking if the absolute value of any of the above cross products is lower than ǫ quad .
SCHEME ANALYSIS
We first explain and prove the properties of our ranging protocol in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. We note that the ranging protocol itself mitigates a large class of attacks, as demonstrated by properties (r2) and (r3). Then, in Section 5.3 we prove that our scheme is secure against 2-end wormhole attacks. Finally, we evaluate its performance in a benign setting in Section 5.4. For the case of k-end wormhole attacks, we refer the reader to the corresponding technical report [15] .
Ranging
For this part of the analysis, we assume A and B to be correct nodes executing the ranging protocol, with A as the initiator. We will show that the ranging protocol satisfies the following properties: (r1) If the protocol terminates successfully and B calculates dBA, then either dBA ≈ |AB| or dBA ≈ (|AWA|+ |WBB| + τ ), where WA and WB are the relay nodes close to A and B, respectively, and τ is the distance corresponding to the additional delay that the adversary might impose on the RN G message).
(r2) The protocol prevents the creation of very long false links, i.e., links that span more than c 2 × ǫsync.
(r3) The protocol prevents the creation of any false links by a store-and-forward adversary.
According to the ranging protocol, if B calculates dBA, the following events have happened (in this order, ti are in global time):
(1) At time t1, recorded as t Message m1 is authenticated, and hence can be generated only by A or B. As B checks that N r B is not self-generated, node A had to generate m1 and send it at some point in time t0 < t1, recorded as t A REQ by A. Likewise, m4 can be generated only by A: Node B is ruled out because it would never generate an ACK message for a nonce N s it has not generated itself. Node A would only send the ACK message for B, if at some time t2.1, recorded as t A REP , it had received a REP corresponding to its REQ message that was sent at t0. The only acceptable REP message is m2; as the nonce N r B is fresh and it was encrypted in m1, only B could have generated this REP message. Hence, t2 < t2.1 and therefore t0 < t1 < t2 < t2.1. Thus, we conclude that within an acceptable bound ǫsync at time t1 the clocks of A and B are equal to t A REQ and t B REQ , respectively, if the synchronization test is successful in (4) .
From the above, we instantly get (r2): The round trip propagation delay is equal to (t2.1 − t0) − (t2 − t1) < ǫsync, which means that if the distance between A and B is longer than c 2 × ǫsync, the ranging will fail and (A, B) will be discarded. Hence, the attack of a store-and-forward adversary, which cannot relay a RF message before it entirely receives it, is aborted in the synchronization phase. This is because such an attacker introduces an additional delay, equal to the duration of the exchanged messages, on the synchronization phase. This delay is well above ǫsync, hence (r3) follows.
When A broadcasts the RN G message m3 at some time t2.2, it is the first time N s is sent in clear. Thus, it is not possible for a relay node, WB, to send m3 before another relay node, WA, receives m3 sent by A at t2.2. Moreover, the integrity of m4 is protected, hence B learns t A RNG that is the actual time of sending m3 in A's clock. As we have shown that the synchronization phase is secure, B measures correctly, within an acceptable bound, the difference between t2.2 and t3, the time at which it received the nonce. Thus, the distance to A calculated by B is either |AB|, or |AWA| + |WBB| + τ . Hence, (r1) follows.
Symmetry Test
We show that the delay that is introduced on a relay link must be the same in both directions for all false links the attacker creates over that relay link. Otherwise, the attacker cannot successfully pass the symmetry test for some of the links over the wormhole. Assume node A is on one side of the relay link, and nodes B and C are on the other side. The adversary relays the RN G message, sent by node B and received (over the wormhole) by node A, with delay τ1, and relays the RN G message sent by node C, also received (over the wormhole) by node A, with delay τ2. Node A also sends a RN G message, which needs to be received by both B and C if links (A, B) and (A, C) are not to be discarded by the link symmetry test. To further satisfy the symmetry test the adversary needs to relay the RN G message of A with delay τ1 (for symmetry of link (A, B)) and at the same time with delay τ2 (for symmetry of link (A, C)). Hence, τ1 = τ2.
Security against 2-end Wormholes
In this section, we investigate the security of our scheme against the most commonly considered relay attack: the single wormhole, that is a relay attack utilizing two remote wormhole ends. We assume the wormhole to be remote, in other words, no valid link exists between correct nodes on opposite sides of the wormhole (i.e., in vicinity of relay nodes). Moreover, we limit the analysis to the case where there is no obstacle in the network.
It is easy to show that an attempt to relay a RN G message between two nodes A and B on the same side of the wormhole fails. Indeed, the RN G message sent by A will reach B directly before the relayed one does. The latter message will either be ignored, or it will collide with the former. In neither case the relaying leads to an incorrect distance calculation. Therefore, the adversary can only effectively relay over the wormhole.
For convenience, we denote the areas on the opposite sides of the wormhole as the left side of the wormhole and the right side. To create a false link, the adversary needs to convince 4 nodes that they form a convex quadrilateral. There are two choices in terms of the number of victim nodes located on both sides of the wormhole: 2 nodes on each side (2-2), and 3 nodes on one and 1 node on the other side of the wormhole (3-1).
(2-2): We show that for this case the adversary is unable to create any false links.
Denote the nodes on the left side of the wormhole as A, B and the nodes on the right side of the wormhole as C, D. Links AB and CD need to be legitimate, whereas links AC, AD, BC and BD will be created over the wormhole (see Figure 2(a) for notation) . There are two ways in which a convex quadrilateral can be formed:
1. AB and CD are the opposite sides of a quadrilateral (Figure 2(b) ). In this case:
However, in a quadrilateral (of positive volume) the sum of diagonals' length (|AD| + |BC|) is always greater than the sum of two opposite sides (|AC| + |BD|). This contradiction implies that the adversary cannot succeed with this construction.
2. AB and CD are the diagonals of a convex quadrilateral (Figure 2(c) ). Denote X to be the intersection of AB and CD, with |AX| + |XB| = x and |CX| + |XD| = y. The triangle inequalities for triangles ACX, BCX, BDX, DAX in Figure 2 (c), added together, give x + y > a+b+c+d+2t > a+b+c+d. However, the triangle inequalities for ABW1 and CDW2 in Figure 2 (a) give x + y < a + b + c + d. This (second) contradiction implies the adversary cannot create a false link in the 2-2 case.
(3-1): For this case, depicted in figure 2(d), the adversary cannot create any false links, unless t + d = 0.
First, assume that τ = t + d > 0, and also the adversary can convince the correct nodes that ABCD is a quadrilateral. This means that AD, BD and CD intersect in a single point (Figure 2(e) ). Then |AD| − |AW1| = τ , |BD| − |BW1| = τ and |CD| − |CW1| = τ . This implies that A, B and C lie on a hyperbola with foci W1 and D, more precisely on the hyperbola arm closer to W1 (Figure 2(f) ). As this hyperbola arm is concave, 3 points A, B, C cannot form a convex quadrilateral with point D and hence they cannot validate false links AD, BD or CD. Therefore, no false links can be verified.
On the contrary, if t + d = 0, from the perspective of correct nodes D = W1, and ABCD forms a convex quadrilateral. Hence all the false links AD, BD and CD will be verified. However, the applicability and effectiveness of this attacks are limited. For the equality to hold, the adversary must add negligible delay when relaying the message, and the wormhole end W2 needs to be located in the same place as node D. Deploying a relay node at a distance less than a few centimeters from a sensor mote might be difficult considering their physical appearance. Besides, such a closely placed relay node would act as an obstacle and would degrade communication of the node under attack with its legitimate neighbors. Finally, even if the adversary successfully mounts this attack, all the false links are adjacent to one node (D) -which might be easily avoided by a node-disjoint route selection algorithm, e.g. [10] .
Performance Evaluation in Benign Setting
To evaluate the performance of our protocol in a benign setting, we performed the following simulations. We distributed from 80 to 480 nodes uniformly in a field measuring 400 × 400m, assigning the nodes' transmission range to be 100m. We repeated this 1000 times. The unit disk graph (UDG) model has been used for determining neighbors of nodes. The values of the maximum distance estimation error e (as percentage of maximum range R) reflect, and even overestimate, the values we obtained in our experiments (Section 6.2). The value of ǫ quad is set to 2e. Coverage. Links have to satisfy the convex quadrilateral test to be verified by our protocol. Yet, even in a benign setting, some links might not belong to any convex quadrilateral, and therefore remain unverifiable. The coverage of the verification protocol is defined as the percentage of verifiable links. Figure 3 shows the coverage of the protocol vs. the average degree of nodes (i.e., average number of nodes that can be ranged by each node). For the networks with average node degree above 7, the coverage is more than 90%. We also note that only a negligible fraction of links cannot be verified due to the distance estimation error.
Communication Complexity A protocol run requires a node to transmit 3 RF messages (REQ, REP , ACK) to each of its neighbors, and to broadcast one US (RN G) and one RF message (N T E) to all neighbors. Hence, the protocol's communication complexity is constant per link.
Computational Complexity Testing whether a 4-clique is a convex quadrilateral, is by far the most computationally expensive component of our tests, explained in Section 4.3. As such, to estimate the computational complexity of the protocol, we count the "number of tested 4-cliques" per node. Figure 4 shows the number of tested 4-cliques vs. the average degree of nodes, for various distance measurement error values e. As it is shown, the number of tested 4-cliques for each node is almost linear to the number of its neighbors (i.e., constant per link).
IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we describe the implementation of the ranging protocol on sensor motes and achieved experimental results. The security tests are not implemented on the sensor motes. The experimental results confirm the applicability of our protocol.
We used Cricket software v2 as the basis of our project and TinyOS v1 [6] as the operating system installed on the Cricket motes. To make the ultrasound signal omnidirectional, we simply mounted a metal cone on top of the motes to make the signals omnidirectional (similar to [19] ).
Protocol Implementation
Neighbor Discovery. We implemented neighbor discovery as a simple 3-way handshake mechanism. The neighbor discovery process runs once when a mote is turned on. Because the key distribution protocol is orthogonal to our work, we did not implement any key exchange protocol. Instead, for simplicity, we assigned the cryptographic keys to motes before the nodes deployment.
Ranging. Ranging is the core component of the protocol. After a given node starts ranging, authenticated REQ messages are sent repeatedly to all of its neighbors every 100 milliseconds. This time interval is large enough to receive the corresponding REP message from the demanded neighbor. The starting time of transmission and reception of all REQ and REP messages are recorded using (32-bit) microsecond local timers. The accurate reception time of the messages is computed, after considering the delay introduced by bit alignment and the interrupt handling of radio frames (as described in [8] ).
After finishing the synchronization phase, the initiator generates a 150µs pulse of 40 KHz ultra-sound using the US transducer, as the signal for distance measurement. Then, the ultra-sound nonce, N s , will be transmitted using a simple on-off modulation. Every 65 milliseconds, a similar US pulse is sent if the corresponding bit of the nonce is 1. Otherwise, no signal is transmitted. The interval of sending successive bits is large enough (65 milliseconds) to avoid the inter-symbol interference.
All receivers, upon receiving the ultrasound signal store the arrival time to be used for distance measurement. To reconstruct the ultra-sound nonce, the receivers repeatedly listen to the channel. And in each interval if they receive the signal it is considered as 1. In the end, the assembled nonce is compared with the expected one (sent in REQ) and the records are discarded in the case of a discrepancy.
Finally, the initiator node sends the ACK message separately to all of the neighbors. Upon receiving the ACK message, nodes are able to calculate the distance and update their neighbor table. To compute the distance, based on the sound time-of-flight, we also consider the effect of the reflective cone we use above the ultrasound transducer; it always adds 10cm to the measured distance.
Experimental Results
Between 10 and 15 nodes were deployed on the floor in different configurations in a 4 × 4m room without obstacles in between. We placed nodes in different positions and, after running the protocol for several runs, results were processed off-line. To study to what extent the reflected cone effects the accuracy of the measurement, we ran the protocol also when nodes were located in positions where they could directly face each other around a circle. For each configurations we let the protocol run up to 70 rounds. Next, we present the results of the experiments that confirm the applicability of our protocol.
We investigate the applicability of the protocol in terms of the time synchronization, distance measurement, and link symmetry errors, due to the wireless medium irregularity.
Time Synchronization Error. Analyzing the results of all synchronization data (time-stamps) during the experiments, we derived that 99.55% of them met the constraints and only 0.45% of the links were discarded because the synchronization error was more than a ǫsync = 5µs threshold.
Distance Measurement Error. Nodes could reliably range each other for distances up to 4 meters when they were deployed on the floor with the cones on top of the transmitter unit. In these conditions, we achieved a maximum error of 5cm, where errors were positive values. In the face to face deployment, the maximum transmission range was 10 meters with maximum error of 3cm.
Link Symmetry Error. For each pair of nodes, A and B, we computed |dAB − dBA| as the link symmetry error. This is used to adjust both ǫsym and ǫ quad parameters. The observed symmetry error was below 7cm for 97% of the cases, and it was below 2cm for 74% of the cases. When the motes where placed in a circle of 4m diameter, facing each other, a maximum symmetry error of 2cm was experienced for 97% of the links.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have designed a secure neighbor verification protocol tailored for wireless sensor networks. To demonstrate its applicability to WSN, we have provided a proof-of-concept implementation on existing off-the-shelf hardware (Cricket motes). We have proved that the protocol is secure against the classic 2-end wormhole attack. Yet, our scheme is also effective against more complex relay attacks, as we have demonstrated with simulations in the associated technical report [15] .
Our scheme can be extended. For example, the scheme can be relatively easy augmentable to 3D networks by replacing the quadrilateral test with its equivalent in the new setting. Moreover, other distance estimation techniques are worthy of being implemented as (probably better) alternatives for US-based measurement.
